Cosmopolitanism comes in many forms
The main question when considering issues in global ethics from a political perspective is: what are the bounds of justice and morality? For example, do political borders, such as state, regional or national borders, have any bearings on our moral duties? Do we have more duties to those whom we have more in common with, for instance, fellow nationals? If moral duties are influenced by political and social structures and boundaries, then are current systems fit for the purpose?
We start by considering moral cosmopolitanism, which, as its name proposes, holds that there is an "ethical sphere" that rises above national or social limits and subsequently that ethical commitments have a global aspect. The term "cosmopolitan" originates with the Stoics and is derived from "cosmos" meaning "world" and "polis" meaning "state" or "city". The Stoics, from whom the term "stoical" is derived, were a school of ancient Athenian philosophers founded in the third century BCE, who argued for universal reason of nature (logos). In keeping with this view of nature and humans' part in it, the Stoics claimed that they were citizens of the world, and identified themselves with, and owed allegiance to, all humanity, not just their local geographical, religious, ethnic or cultural group. The "Stoic's" conviction that they were "citizens of the world" still captures the essence of cosmopolitanism; they all considered the ethics to be global in nature with an emphasis of their group having to extend responsibilities across borders.
The first defining feature of cosmopolitanism is that the moral sphere is global with responsibilities that tend to emphasise actions motivated by responsibilities that extend beyond national borders. The second is the accentuation on the individual: the conviction that the individual has moral worth. The third element of cosmopolitanism is fairness: all people have a measure of good worth. These three elements are standard in different definitions of cosmopolitanism. The final, fourth feature of cosmopolitanism, which is little discussed in political theory (perhaps because it is assumed), is that it focuses on the political realm.
The third and fourth criteria of cosmopolitanism imply that it is global in scope and tends to consider political structures and institutions. Its main concerns are to address the relationships of groups and institutions as well as individuals, and in addition it focuses on structural networks and frameworks of governance as well as individual duties. Therefore, as well as focusing on the rightness and wrongness of individual actions, cosmopolitanism considers the political and practical aspects of carrying out such actions. For example, cosmopolitans will consider how rights are best attained and how duties can be fulfilled and needs met as well as what those rights and duties might be. Accordingly, it is no surprise that cosmopolitans concern themselves primarily with the institutions that are responsible for ensuring moral practices and political and legal mechanisms by which justice can be attained.
Cosmopolitan theorists therefore focus on the content and weight of obligations across state boundaries. In moral discourse the focus is on duties of individual agents to other individual agents; whereas in political discourse obligations are seen particularly in terms of political structures, hence the aim being to combine moral theories with political theories.
These four claims commit you not to a position where all obligations of justice are global, but rather to a more minimal view that there are at least some global obligations that go beyond national borders. This view is sometimes termed as "weak cosmopolitanism", by contrast "strong cosmopolitanism" holds that the global sphere is the primary moral sphere. On this view, all duties of justice are motivated from a global perspective and national or regional borders are considered to be morally and ethically insignificant from a global perspective. For a strong cosmopolitan, principles of justice that apply within society or nation should apply globally as there are no local or community deciding factors concerning who gets what in terms of goods, resources or rights.
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To understand the foundations behind cosmopolitanism and the emergence of global ethics one needs to understand contemporary approaches to justice as a key focal point of political theory. To do this, one must consider the work of John Rawls, particularly in his 1971 book, A Theory of Justice, where he has informed the most prominent contemporary theories of global justice and has been especially influential in the work of current cosmopolitan theorists and proponents of global ethics, including Broc, Caney, Moellendorf, and Pogge. Although Rawls did not consider his theory of justice to be applied on a global scale, it is his theory and his proposed principles of justice that have inspired much current cosmopolitan thinking.
Rawls' A Theory of Justice sets out principles of justice that are intended to be adopted by all. Rawls argues that fair principles of justice are those that would be agreed in what he calls the "original position". The original position is a hypothetical agreement that Rawls proposes as a means to work out what the principles of justice should be and to ensure that once determined they would be binding. Rawls claims that principles derived from the original position were those that all free and rational persons concerned with their own self-interest would agree to. Once the principles had been decided in this way, then, they would be applied to all further situations to determine the just or fair solution. These principles, in a normative sense, would then be used to constitute the foundation of a just and national society.
The original position is essentially a thought experiment that Rawls believed resulted in fair principles of justice that would be accepted by all. In the thought experiment, those who are considering what is just are blinded to their own situation in order that they come up with fair principles for all, rather than biased principles that benefit people and groups in one situation and circumstance. Key to the original position's claim to fairness, in the design of the principles of justice, is the veil of ignorance (being blinded to your own situation). Crucially, those behind the veil of ignorance do not know if they are rich or poor, strong or weak, black or white, male or female and so on. Essentially, the aim is to remove any concern that arises as a result of a person's actual situation or social circumstances in order to ensure that the final developed principles are unprejudiced.
The veil of ignorance strips individuals of their particular characteristics, biases, and concerns and assumes that, rather than cater to their own particular needs and attempt to skew the system to benefit themselves or their own group, principles of justice that are fair to all will be devised. The claim is that the veil of ignorance makes the principles of justice free from economic, social, cultural, religious, gender, and class biases. In Rawls' (1999a) words, "the veil of ignorance ensures that all are equal in the original position."
The scope of Rawls' principles of justice and the fact they include commitments to civil liberties as well as to distributive justice requires that issues of practice are addressed as well as theory. Accordingly, a pressing question is how the principles of justice are to be implemented. For Rawls, the principles apply fundamentally to what he calls the "basic structure" of society: that is, the key institutions that define rights and shape the way we can and cannot live our lives in society; in other words to the structure of society and the governance mechanisms, for instance, legal frameworks and political institutions.
Rawls' methodology, and the position he seeks to establish by using it, is expressly liberal. The focus of the original position thought experiment is on formulating principles that then ensure a fair arrangement for all persons and liberty for each of them. This approach has been widely and critically discussed. One problem worth mentioning is that it appears to overlook the social relationships in which the hypothetical parties will inevitably end up in actual society. Rawls says that although the parties are divested of knowledge of their particular social role or status, the parties must know that there are all sorts of different roles and statuses, one of which each will come to occupy. But could a party in the original position not rightly worry not just about which particular position she is going to occupy, but also about the relationships of her position to other positions; in other words, about what society and her relationships within it will be like? This leads us to an important question that is the focus of this paper: would the relevant parties choose the principles Rawls thinks they would?
This question leads us to the point about the exclusion of social relationships from Rawls' normative framework that also underpins a more general concern about the conception of the individual person in Rawls' and other liberal positions; namely, whether it conceives of moral persons in an unrealistic and undesirably isolated and individualistic way that directs their different roles within society. The point of view presented in this paper is that such normative frameworks and their use to ground the fundamental principles of human rights in global ethics need to incorporate a social domain since its relevance is inherently part of the humanity that concerns itself with issues in global ethics.
"Rights exist when one party can effectively insist that another deliver goods, services, or protections, and third parties will act to reinforce their delivery" (Tilly, 1998, p. 56) . Thus, universal human rights as developed within the domain of global ethics are principally held against the state, which has a correlative duty to respond, and there is a growing array of international instruments and institutions dedicated to their recognition and enforcement. However, rights in their concrete functioning and relevance are inherently social, and hence have a broader significance in that "rights imply a respect that places one in the referential range of self and others, that elevates one's status from human body to social being" (Williams, 1992; cited in Baynes, 2000, p. 451) . In other words, rights function as both a legitimising expression of, and a dynamic influence upon, the nature of relationships between individuals, and between the individual and society. As Hynes et al. (2010, p. 812) state: "human rights are not seen as beyond social life, rather they are invoked and reproduced through struggles at the heart of social life."
In general, social theory has been typically skeptical about the existence of a "human nature" held in common where universal rights are declared, and about its status as the source of a universal conception of justice and human rights and obligations. Instead the emphasis tends to be rather on the importance of a particular social context in specific times and places, which generate different systems of values and beliefs pertaining to different modes of life. Indeed, the conceptualisation of both "human" and "rights" is commonly argued to have emerged from a particular social and historical moment in western thought (Pagden, 2000; 2003) . In this sense, social theory is essentially questioning about the idea of trans-historical, transcultural, "human nature", being more focused upon the social forces which construct individuals and social beings and on the human rather than the natural origins of both legal and moral norms (Fine, 2013) . Indeed, Fine argues that the denaturing of social relations has led to a dismissive or hostile attitude towards the very idea of human rights in the global ethics arena.
Indeed, Durkheim's insistence on social facts have tended to revise normative considerations and offer an inclusion of social facts in the generation and realisation of human rights, and this may offer a better solution to the "problem" of normativity and the value dimension of human rights. Rights may therefore be construed as functioning in the social structure that contributes to shaping the interpersonal relations and mutually guiding perceptions of members of society.
One needs to appreciate that aspects of cosmopolitanism, as discussed earlier, embrace both the expansion of rights and the conception of society beyond national boundaries on the basis of universal ideals. However, there needs to be a transformative aspect to cosmopolitanism scholarship that combines a normative position with social analysis. This will require the emergence, at a national level, of a different kind of cosmopolitanism linked strongly to human rights principles as detailed in Habermas (1998) and of the development of the idea of cosmopolitan citizenship similar to that advocated by Isin and Turner (2007) that may support struggles over rights that can extend beyond borders.
In such a framework, civil society is directed with a key role that acts as the driving force for change; according to Habermas (1996) , such a civil society is vital to ensure the promotion of areas of public concern and to provide methodologies where neglected issues and underrepresented groups will tend to be mo-CRIS Bulletin 2016/01 tivated to showing a willingness "to go beyond self-defence and take a universalist stand against the open or concealed exclusion of minorities or marginal groups" (Habermas, 1996, p. 376) . If normative ethical frameworks such as cosmopolitanism can be constructed in this manner then there is a greater scope in their application to global ethics issues. For example, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), which is not legally binding, clearly dictates the right for an individual to seek and enjoy asylum. However it directs no necessary obligation upon countries to offer asylum; in a similar manner, the European Convention on Human Rights provides directives of basic rights, but many may be subject to limitations, necessary qualifications, and conditions. In such declarations and conventions, although the language of universal human rights tends to convey a sense of ethical certainty, in contrast the actual practice of human rights shows itself to be a less stable and certain ground.
Access to necessary rights is generally managed by the state, and a minor number of rights ensured in existing trans-national declarations are those that tend to be fraught with detailed requirements and deliberate complicated interpretations. A portion of the purported all inclusive human rights can be qualified with reference to national security, open wellbeing or the financial prosperity of the nation, while even those rights which are supreme bring up troublesome issues of utilisation. Other "lesser" rights which are in any case incorporated into the UDHR, for example, the privilege to work, to welfare, or to medicinal services, might be complementary and in this way restricted to nationals of co-signatory states only. The practical demonstration of such human rights and their incorporation into universal declarations is seen currently in the flow of migrants and asylum seekers across Europe. Beck (2006) describes this as one of the important consequences of the "cosmopolitanisation" of society. Although Beck's writing in this area is largely concerned with the right to be different, he argues that such examples of migrants and asylum seekers demonstrates a universalism based on the respect for others as equals that categorically neglects the importance of differences of identity and social standing amongst different societies. Exploring current academic work in this arena of cultural rights, one finds that the majority of academics seem to assume that such identity statuses have already been successfully incorporated in prior considerations of developed ethical frameworks (e.g. Taylor, 1994) , when in fact experience shows the contrary; that most trans-national migrants must first undergo a lengthy and uncertain process of scrutiny and selection. Human rights claims and declarations in the arena of global ethics therefore tend to function more as a source of power and control rather than ethical frameworks that consider the rights of individuals equally; hence by their very nature their work in contrary to their claims to universality. It has often been argued that such rights represent a "false universal" (see Philips, 1992; Lister, 2003; Richardson, 1998 ). An analogous claim can be made with respect to the ethnocentric nature of the efficient functioning of many rights and, in the case of trans-national migrants, it may be that cultural differences combined with patterns of social disadvantage and discrimination tend to yield the kind of implementation inefficiency noted above. Mutua (2002, p. 3) writes, "the human rights corpus as a philosophy that seeks the diffusion of liberalism and its primacy around the globe can ironically be seen as favourable to political and cultural homogeneity and hostile to difference and diversity."
Mutua puts forward a persuasive argument and states that the current framework of institutionalised human rights together with its universal normative implications cannot effectively respond to the needs of less developed countries as it is insufficiently sensitive to indigenous cultural and social practices. For him, the development of the UDHR can be observed as being sporadically tarnished by the brutal history of the colonial powers that pressed for its "universal" adoption, while the international law-making authorities tended to traditionally be out of reach of Third World countries. Mutua also writes of the coercive initiatives that use developmental assistance, aid, and trade as a means to enforcing compliance with a western human rights agenda. In fact, contemporary anthropological writings (Wilson, 1997; Wilson and Mitchell, 2003; Goodale, 2006) bring the argument full circle in documenting a process of what Merry (2006) terms "vernacularisation" and "indigenisation" whereby human rights ideals are reframed and presented in terms of existing cultural norms, values, and practices. To this extent, the discipline of anthropology has recently undertaken an ethnographic study of human rights, and it has categorically rejected the prevalent definition of "universal" rights adopted by the American Anthropological Association in 1947 (Goodale, 2006) . This development has motivated a variety of interesting studies that focus on the particular usages of human rights discourse and principles to address matters of local concern within an international framework of ethics.
Having presented several arguments that tend to support the inclusion of societies and their plurality within a universal framework of human rights, let us now return back to Rawls and see what attempts have been made by different scholars to re-formulate his framework. Rawls envisaged his principles as binding both "liberal-democratic peoples" and "burdened societies"; the long term aim was to bring all societies under the Law of Peoples, but dealing with outlaw states is seen to depend on political wisdom, and thus to lie outside the terrain of political philosophy. As to burdened societies, the principles that Rawls proposed include a duty to assistance, and Rawls considers whether such support presupposes a degree of affinity. The nurturing of such affinity is also held to be the task of statesmen, and is not viewed as a fixed thing, such that "as co-operation between people proceeds, they may come to care more about each other, and affinity between them becomes stronger. Hence they are no longer moved by self-interest but by mutual concern" (Rawls, 1999, p. 113) . Rawls argues that the crucial elements here are not resources but political and civic virtues; burdened societies can solve their problems internally by becoming better "ordered". Beitz (2004, p. 206) has commented on Rawls' proposal and says that he finds no answer here to the question of what it means to guarantee such rights. Beitz instead imagines an original position composed of representatives of peoples who are sensitive to the interests of the individuals who make up their collectivity. He then conjectures that these representatives would agree to establish a human right to an adequate standard of living, including a duty of international contribution to the costs, thus establishing the right as an element of the Law of Peoples and a requirement of international justice. Again, this argument resonates with Turner's (1993) approach which sees a foundation for human rights in the shared condition of bodily frailty, such that we see in the plight of others our own possible (future) misery. Beitz makes an important and related remark on the limited status of human rights in Rawls' model, noting that Rawls (2004, p. 201) explicitly disowns a notion of human rights based on "a teleological, philosophical, or moral conception of the human person" but offers no foundational theory for the rights he proposes. In Rawls' (2004, p. 202 ) model they may serve as a "shared basis for public action", but according to Beitz (2004, p. 210) , "human rights are not simply desirable goals but are morally necessary ones" and should feature as such in the international arena relating to human rights. Nussbaum (2007) also offers a much wider ranging critique of The Law of Peoples, starting from the assertion that an adequate refashioning of the existing international order would require much more radical thinking about the status of national borders and basic economic arrangements, as well as a different conception of human interests. More fundamentally she argues against a universal procedural approach to justice based on the assumptions of cooperation for mutual advantage, and instead seeks to advance an argument rooted in human dignity, sociability, moral worth, and an "impelling desire for fellowship" (Nussbaum, 2007, p. 36) . Nussbaum argues that Rawls, in contrast, "eschews any assumption of altruism or benevolence on the part of the parties to the social contract" (2007, p. 34) , and that in working from an initial choice situation, contract theory can offer no prior independent account of rights. This might, for example, be rooted in foundational principles, or arrived at intuitively by thinking about what human beings need to live a richly human life. Thus, rather than seeing cooperation as dependent on having something to gain, which poses a problem for trans-national justice, she argues that in the basic sociability, which is a characteristic of human life, we find an interest in sharing as an end in itself. She therefore favours a scheme of public moral education which could support the appropriate extension of benevolent sentiments in social life and be part of a fundamental framework for human rights.
Because human beings are political animals, Nussbaum not only sees their interests as bound up with others throughout their lives, but also recognises that for parts of their life, and in some cases throughout life, people will depend on others. This possibility of dependence -either within or between "peoples" -is not addressed in Rawls' model; the framers of the contract are viewed as independent and equal, as coming together for mutual advantage, and as themselves recipients of the contract. While the reliance on "people" in Rawls' model is intended to allow the attribution of moral motives, and Nussbaum argues that it serves rather to mask unwarranted assumptions of homogeneity of principles, beliefs, resources, and status, and in so doing to eliminate queries about the representative claims of the framers. In addition, it fails to take into account the existing interdependencies of the global economic system, the terms on which it operates, and the disadvantages it imposes on poor nations who are expected to solve their problems internally (Pogge, 1994; Nussbaum, 2007) . Thus the idea of self-contained "peoples" coming together to strike a contract to their mutual advantage is fundamentally flawed, even granted that it is an exercise of the imagination intended to help reconceiving existing relations between states.
Furthermore, while the restriction of the contracting parties to exclude "burdened societies" is a necessary element in securing mutual advantage for the rest, this device seems to surrender at the start some of the functions that "Law of Peoples" might perform. Indeed, as Nussbaum observes (2007, p. 250) excluding poor nations from the contract is in line with the current world order, and a contract of mutual advantage can never include them as equal partners; yet if they are to be included as recipients of charity, then a different account of the purpose of social cooperation would be required. This most basic failing of the model brings into question its universal application to issues in global ethics.
Summing up Rawls' position on international justice, O'Neill (2004) remarks on a feature of A Theory of Justice which recurs in his later work on justice beyond borders; that is the idea of society as a closed system. The same assumption in The Law of Peoples is argued to render an account of "international" justice as based on a contract between bounded territories, which undermines any ambitions for a more thoroughgoing treatment of global inequality. O'Neill therefore looks for alternative perspectives, and focuses her attention on the problem of duties. Her ironic observation is that many respected accounts of justice with cosmopolitan aspirations assume without argument that the primary agents of justice will be states, but in so doing they undermine their own orientation and objectives. While such accounts may embrace the principle that justice is owed to all, they nevertheless see obligations as strongly constrained by state boundaries and states' internal commitments to inhabitants. One example of this uneasy combination is UDHR, which assumes that the counterpart obligations for the fulfillment of human rights are held by states, and generally speaking are obligations owed to their citizens or members. O'Neill argues that we need a clearer grounding of both rights and obligations which she views as mutually dependent. A realist approach to this issue is that rights are only meaningful when there are clearly identified correlative duties assigned to states. However, many states prove unable or unwilling to deliver on obligations of justice to their own citizens, while in the realm of international justice the full cooperation of states is even less certain. "Obligations cannot be coherently ascribed to agents or agencies that are incapable of carrying them... both institutions and individuals can have obligations if and only if they have adequate capabilities to fulfill or discharge [them] , (O'Neill, 2004, p. 251) .
O'Neill recognises that when states do not have the capacity to secure the rights of their populations this does not mean that the individuals affected have fewer rights, but simply that their rights cannot be fully realised. Here she sees a role for non-state actors, notably trans-national Corporations and Nongovernmental Organisations (NGOs), which may be seen as secondary agents of justice. It is unclear from this argument, however, how such secondary obligations would be grounded, while the original focus on trans-national duties gets lost in concern about the capacities of weak states to fulfill their internal obligations. These issues have been pursued in a more radical manner by other writers.
Sen (2004) sees a disjuncture between the strong moral appeal of human rights, the "softness" of its conceptual grounding, and the problem of obligation, all of which have particular significance for the status of economic and social rights. He is wary of an approach to human rights which is overly legalistic and starts instead from the view that human rights are primarily ethical demands rather than legally established obligations. Their significance relates to the achievement of certain human freedoms, which can be construed both in terms of process and of opportunity, and thus embrace both civil and political, and social and economic rights. These ethical rights then generate reasons for action that can support both perfect and imperfect obligations. For Sen, proclamations of human rights such as the UDHR are to be seen as ethical articulations and not putative legal claims couched in ethical language. Although the demands contained in such declarations take the form of perfect obligations, Sen argues that there are related imperfect obligations which place an onus on all to help achieve the goal expressed by the right. Legalisation and institutionalisation may have been the principal focus for the realisation of such rights, but an ethical understanding of rights means that they represent moral claims that can be advanced in a variety of ways, and there is a responsibility on everyone to consider their own imperfect obligations. Thus social recognition of a right has a moral power even when there is no practical means of enforcement, and here Sen, like O'Neill, sees an important role for non-governmental organisations (NGOs).
The question of how to more effectively engage public morals and sentiment in the mitigation or prevention of global inequality has caught the attention of a good many social theorists, and Pogge (2007; 2008) has become identified with a specific approach which elaborates a minimal requirement -to refrain from doing harm. Pogge's starting point is that human rights should be construed as a set of moral requirements which exist independently of supporting institutions; that is the line of dependence runs from the moral commitment to its observance and institutionalisation, not vice versa. The respect for human rights is therefore sustained not by legal and political systems alone, but by the attitude of the people, which is in turn shaped by the system of education and economic distribution under which they live. Pogge makes the distinction between an interactional understanding of human rights, in which each right requires a corresponding duty, and which maximally applies to all individuals in a position to affect the right; and an institutional understanding in which the social system is organised, as far as reasonably possible, to secure the human rights of all its members. One interesting focus of Pogge's work, that is particularly relevant to our criticism of the universal application of normative ethical theories to global ethical issues, has been our capacity to remain untroubled by the severe poverty experienced by almost half of the world's population, and his intuition comes close to more general thinking on the sociology of denial. See for example, his argument that "unconsciously, at least, people tend to interpret their moral values in their own favour and tend to select, represent, and connect the facts so as to facilitate the desired concrete judgements. This rationalising tendency is much stronger in people surrounded by others whose relevant interests resemble their own" (Pogge, 2008, pp. 4-5) . Pogge (2008) considers the superficial reasons commonly put forward as justifications for avoiding the normative demands of global poverty on our moral conscience, borrowing Hirschman's (1991) typology of futility, jeopardy, and perversity. The force of futility rests on the assumption that we cannot meaningfully contribute to a solution, given the scale of the problem; jeopardy relates to the view that we cannot eradicate world poverty at a cost the rich countries could bear; and perversity is rooted in the argument that assistance would lead to over-population and increased poverty. These reasons as motivations towards collective non-action are generally not present in the formulation of the original position of Rawls. These common sentiments can all be contested, as Pogge shows, but the puzzle is why these denials seem to have such a constraining effect on our moral and social imagination. This is now a pressing issue in the public arena amongst groups such as Oxfam and Amnesty International, for whom action is the issue, and who seek to address the problem of how to break the syndrome of denial before the uncomfortable facts can be filed away, and to turn this knowledge instead into action. In relation to any catastrophe there will always be those who do act, and who may do so in the face of strong peer pressure in the opposite direction. So the question for advocacy groups has been one of how to break the impulse to turn away from terrible suffering in distant places, and how to challenge a "powerful meta-rule"; to look after your own people first. Cohen (2001, p. 276) states that the psychological concept of denial cannot unproblematically be transposed to the political level, but nor is the process he describes an inevitable process, universally inscribed in the process of the brain. It is rather made up of a variety of highly contextualised linguistic devices and cultural practices which vary over time and space, and as such, must be amenable to change by consciousness raising, education, and other forms of intervention, the implication being made here is that compassion can be taught and it needs to be incorporated and taken into account in any developments that focus to explain the moral motivation behind the application of normative ethical frameworks to issues in global ethics.
The urgent problem of extending justice to all world citizens, showing theoretically how we may realise a world that is just as a whole, in which accidents of birth and national origin do not wrap people's life chances pervasively and from the start requires a serious approach that does not only take a classical framework, but incorporates as its roots the social challenges that society brings, the classical theory of the social contract cannot solve such problems adequately.
We observe, some of the discussion presented earlier that the majority of the major Western theories of social justice tend to begin from the nation or the state as their basic starting point, it is however highly unlikely that new theoretical structures of global ethics can be adequately developed where the social challenges prevalent are not incorporated. A theoretical framework may be truly great at providing adequate explanations for moral motivation, and yet have serious limitations in some areas relating to the sociological sources of such motivation. For example, the development of classical theories that rested on the public and private distinction historically tended to contain severe problems when it came to confirming the equality of women. We need to appreciate that such problems are not simply problems in the domain of academic philosophy to be discussed in the philosophical "ivory towers" but that the doctrines of the social contract have a deep rooted and broad influence in our social and political lives. The social development of our identities and different cultural influences define who we are and why we get together; this shapes our thinking about what emotional, ethical, social, cultural, and political principles we should favour in directing our lives and what we should be involved with in their mental framing and motivation. Such choices have been the basis of human civilizations and the common beliefs that some citizens are parasites on society and others "normally productive," are the offshoots of a cultured hierarchical social structure that erroneously bring about, in the popular imagination, the belief of the idea of society as a scheme of cooperation for mutual advantage.
Although the initial intention of this paper is to question the effective exploratory nature of traditional normative frameworks relating to questions concerning human rights, in attempting to do so it engages with fundamental philosophical ideas, paying particular attention to the relevant social and cultural complexities that play a moral motivational role in societies, it is also intended as a paper in practical philosophy which may offer some direction in guiding us back to some richer ideas of social cooperation that do not involve such difficulties and in the process developing further ethical frameworks to attend to these difficulties.
Although people can certainly engage in living their practical life and deal with all its related matters coping with all these issues without such a detailed philosophical investigation, I am inclined to believe that the detailed investigation proposed in this paper is fundamentally helpful, both because it shows respect for people motivated by the values we hold as being part of our humanity, and further it is always helpful to see exactly how our socialisation experiences as a species have motivated our moral behaviour.
